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Chapter pages in book: (p. 33 - 40)cent in 1952 without serious inflationary consequences. Wholesale
prices decreased during 1952, and the prices of consumer goods
and services rose only modestly (Chart 4).
Real government expenditures increased more than real gross
national product between 1951 and 1952. More than half the in-
crease in real government expenditures was offset by a substantial
drop in real gross private domestic investment, and increased con-
sumer expenditures accounted for 60 per cent of the increase in
real gross national product (Chart 11).
The decrease in gross private domestic investment was entirely
due to a reduced rate of inventory accumulation. The quarterly
data reveal that inventory investment declined from the third
quarter of 1951 until the second quarter of 1952, and then in-
creased once in the third and fourth quarters of 1952 (Chart
6). By mid-i 952 the stock-sales ratios of wholesalers and retailers
had been substantially reduced from the abnormal levels of the
previous year, and the increased inventory investment of the latter
half of 1952 served only to maintain these ratios as sales increased
(Chart 9). Thus the excessive stocks accumulated by distributors
during and shortly after the inflationary phase were worked off by
mid-1952, and the process of liquidation was in large part respon-
sible for the ease with which the government share of the gross
national product was increased. The rate of growth of government
expen.ditures had tapered off by the time that the inventory liqui-
dation was completed, and a simultaneous gradual increase of
government expenditures, consumer expenditures, and private in-
vestment became possible without undue pressure on prices.
TwoMobilizcition Periods: 1940—1941
and 1950—1951
Itis interesting to compare the economic developments of 1950-
1951 with those of 1940—1941, the years of defense mobilization
which preceded our entry into World War II.Either period is
interesting in itself, since the study of historical episodes in which
some strong and clearly identified new force impinges on the econ-
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34omy is the economist's equivalent of the laboratory experiment,
but even more interest attaches to a comparison of the two periods.
In May 1940 the Low Countries and France were invaded, and
by the end of June, France had fallen. The Korean hostilities be-
gan in June 1950. The economic trends of the succeeding eighteen
months in both periods were strongly influenced by mobilization
programs of approximately equal relative magnitude (see pages
8—10 above).However, the economic environments in which
the dejfense programs were carried out differed in important re-
spects, and the reactions of the economy in the two periods were
by no means identical.
The percentage rates of increase of all major components of
real gross national product between 1940 and 1941 far exceeded
those of 1950—195 1 (Chart 11). Real gross private domestic invest-
ment rose in 1940—1941 eight times as fast as in 1950—1951, and
real government expenditures one-third again as fast.Especially
noteworthy is the very different behavior of consumption in the
two intervals. Real expenditures for consumer goods and services
increased in 1940—1941, but the annual total for 1951 was virtually
the same as for 1950.
In the latter half of 1941 gross national product continued to
grow at a percentage rate comparable to that of the preceding
months (Chart 12), whereas in 1951 the rate of growth diminished
after the second quarter (Chart 1). The vigorous growth of con-
sumer expenditures throughout 1941 contrasts strongly with the
vacillating movements of 1951. Government expenditures grew
more slowly in the last six months of 1951 than in the preceding
nine months, whereas they increased at an accelerated rate in the
second half of 1941. Finally, the decline in private investment in
the third and fourth quarters of 1951 was much more pronounced
than in the corresponding months of 1941.
Physical activity increased along with expenditures throughout
1941. The rapid growth of industrial production and civilian em-
ployment during 1941 (Charts 13 and 14) is in sharp contrast to
the plateaus of 1951 (Charts 2 and 3).
A comparison of price movements reveals what is perhaps the
most interesting contrast between the two periods (Charts 4 and
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15). Wholesale and consumer prices rose much more slowly be-
tween the second quarter of 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 than
between the first and fourth quarters of 1941. Thus, the major
portion of the advance came in the last half of the period, whereas
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Despitethe fact that a recovery from the business cycle trough
of mid-1938 had been under way for two years, the unemployment
ratio stood at 15 per cent in the second quarter of 1940, so that a
large pooi of unemployed labor was available to feed an expansion
in employment and production as the mobilization program pro-
gressed (Chart 14). In fact, 8 per cent of the civilian labor force
was still unemployed at the end of 1941, notwithstanding the sharp
increase in employment during that year. In contrast, only 5 per
39cent of the civilian labor force was unemployed at the time of
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea; by early 1951 the ratio had
dropped to 3 per cent—a low figure by peacetime standards—and
remained at that level through 1951, as employment was virtually
unchanged (Chart 3).
These facts are sufficient to explain why a much larger increase
in real gross national product was possible in 1940—1941 than in
1950—1951. But why were inflationary pressures strong in 1941,
despite large-scale unemployment, and weak in 1951, when the
economy was operating at a high employment level? Part of this
question has already been answered: it was the relaxation of con-
sumer demand that permitted the transfer of resources to the gov-
ernment sector without serious inflationary consequences in 1951.
Conversely, supply forces were in part responsible for the inflation
of 1941, as will be shown presently. Serious shortages of resources
existed in the latter part of 1941, notwithstanding the fact that a
large fraction of the labor force was still unemployed.
ForwardBuying in World War II
Thebuying waves of late 1950 had a historical precedent. Both
production and prices increased after the invasion of Poland on
September 3, 1939. The rise of industrial production and prices
was rapid but short-lived (Charts 13 and 15). Note that whole-
sale prices advanced sharply in September and remained steady
through the remainder of the year. Industrial production, on the
other hand, continued to increase throughout the last quarter of
1939, before declining through the first four months of 1940.
Forward buying by businessmen was responsible for this surge
of activity. Manufacturers' new orders and the sales of manufac-
turers and wholesalers increased sharply in September as buyers
reacted to the coming of the war (Chart 16). Much of this increase
in the value of sales must be attributed to the abrupt rise of whole-
sale prices during the month. The sales of manufacturers and
wholesalers then dipped slightly in October and rose once again
in November, as prices remained stable.
An increase in personal income accompanied the increase in
40